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LEE V. UNITED STATES: THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES 




On March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Padilla v. Kentucky.1  Jose Padilla, born in Honduras, had been living 
in the United States for over four decades as “a lawful permanent 
resident.”2  Years later, however, he was charged with transporting 
marijuana.3  Padilla asked his attorney whether a conviction would 
affect his immigration status, and Padilla’s attorney responded that 
Padilla had nothing to worry about.4  Relying on his attorney’s advice, 
Padilla pled guilty to the crime only to find that his conviction 
mandated automatic deportation.5  Padilla then, in subsequent post-
conviction proceedings, challenged the legality of his guilty plea—
resulting in a denial by the Kentucky Supreme Court followed by an 
appeal to the nation’s highest court.6  The issue before the Supreme 
Court was whether a non-citizen’s Sixth Amendment right to effective 
 
* Zachary Segal is a Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg 
Law Center, B.S.C Political Science & History, 2014, The University of Ottawa.  The author 
would first like to thank Cory Morris for introducing him to the importance of writing about 
contemporary issues by allowing him to co-author articles.  The author would also like to 
thank Professor Richard Klein for his guidance in writing this Note.  Thanks are also due to 
Rhona Mae Amorado for her patience and assistance in structuring this Note.  Finally, this 
Note would not have been possible without the Touro Law Center and Aleph-Institute because 
their dedication to public interest inspired this author to write this Note on a Sixth Amendment 
topic.  All mistakes are the fault of this author and no other.  
1 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
2 Id. at 359. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. 
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assistance of counsel was violated when an attorney fails to advise the 
non-citizen that a criminal conviction could result in deportation.7  
Courts use the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis 
prescribed in the landmark 1984 case, Strickland v. Washington.8  To 
find ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must determine (1) 
whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness”9; and (2) whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.10  In the context of plea agreements, the Court, 
in Hill v. Lockhart,11 held that showing prejudice requires “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”12 Accordingly, the Court in Padilla was presented with two 
specific questions: (1) whether an attorney’s failure to advise his non-
citizen client of deportation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (2) if so, whether his non-citizen client was 
prejudiced as a result of the attorney’s deficient performance because, 
but for counsel’s error, he would have gone to trial.13  
The Court answered the first question in the affirmative by 
holding that an attorney’s performance is objectively unreasonable 
when—regardless of how clear the immigration laws are—he fails to 
inform a non-citizen client that deportation will, or might, follow from 
a conviction.14  The second question, or the prejudice prong, however, 
 
7 Id. at 360 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s 
counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would 
result in his removal from this county.” (internal citations omitted)). 
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
9 Id. at 688. 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
. . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. . . . When a convicted defendant complains of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. . . . The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
Id. at 687-88, 694. 
10 Id. at 688. 
11 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
12 Id. at 59. 
13 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, 372. 
14 Id. at 373-74 (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal 
defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’ To 
satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea 
carries a risk of deportation.” (internal citation omitted)). 
2
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was more complex considering a petitioner needed to show, but for 
counsel’s errors, a reasonable petitioner in his situation would have 
gone to trial even though deportation was inevitable.15  In its analysis 
of the prejudice prong, the Court explained the appropriate question 
was whether a deportable non-citizen’s decision to reject the plea and 
to pursue trial would be rational.16  Instead of answering this question 
in this case, however, the Court remanded that question to Kentucky’s 
highest court as a matter of first impression.17 
In the wake of Padilla, courts were split over whether it would 
be rational for a defendant, facing deportation, to reject a favorable 
plea agreement in order to “throw ‘a Hail Mary’”18 at trial.19  
Specifically, under what, if any, circumstances could prejudice be 
proven when guilt automatically results in deportation?20  Another 
uncertainty facing the lower courts was whether Padilla was 
retroactive.21  In Chaidez v. United States,22 a case decided three years 
after Padilla, the Court held Padilla was not retroactive pursuant to 
 
15 Daniel A. Horwitz, Actually, Padilla Does Apply to Undocumented Defendants, 19 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (“Specifically, these authorities have reasoned that because 
‘a guilty plea does not increase the risk of deportation’ for undocumented defendants, ‘in a 
situation where a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea based on Padilla, and alleges lack of 
knowledge of the risk of deportation, prejudice cannot be established[.]’” (alteration in 
original) (internal citations omitted)). 
16 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
17 Id. at 374 (“Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can 
demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed 
on below.”). 
18 Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311, 313 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 614 
(2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).  Although the Sixth Circuit does not 
explicitly define “Hail Mary,” the context allows the inference that it refers to whether a 
petitioner can try his luck, despite overwhelming odds, that he will obtain a different outcome 
at trial.  See id. 
19 Id. 
As a factual matter, we do not doubt Lee’s contention that many 
defendants in his position, had they received accurate advice from 
counsel, would have decided to risk a longer prison sentence in order to 
take their chances at trial, slim though they were.  
But would such a decision be “rational”? Several courts, including 
this circuit, have said “no”: being denied the chance to throw “a Hail 
Mary” at trial does not by itself amount to prejudice.  
Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See infra Part IV.A. 
22 568 U.S. 342 (2013). 
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Teague v. Lane;23 nevertheless, confusion remained as to whether this 
meant misadvice claims were also denied retroactive effect.24 
In June 2017, Lee v. United States25 answered both questions 
left behind by Padilla when it held, “[W]e cannot agree that it would 
be irrational for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in 
favor of trial.”26  First, Lee expressly held it could be rational for a non-
citizen defendant to reject a plea in lieu of trial when his attorney 
erroneously advises him about whether deportation will result from a 
conviction.27  However, Lee limited this showing to Jae Lee’s (“Lee”) 
unusual circumstances.28  Second, although Chaidez held Padilla is not 
retroactive,29 Chaidez focused on the “new rule” established by Padilla 
(i.e., counsel must inform a defendant of potential immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea).30  Therefore, by accepting petitioner 
Lee’s writ of certiorari, Lee confirmed that Padilla is retroactive 
regarding erroneous immigration advice because Lee was convicted 
one year before the Supreme Court decided Padilla.31  
Lee has wide-ranging effects on non-citizen defendants 
because it implicates both prongs of Strickland.  First, by granting 
 
23 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
24 See infra Part IV.A.4. 
25 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). 
26 Id. at 1968. 
27 Id. at 1968-69. 
28 Id. at 1967. 
29 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 357. 
30 Id. at 346.   
Padilla’s new rule plainly governs failure-to-advise claims . . . leaving 
three possibilities for Padilla’s impact on misadvice claims. First, the new 
rule may encompass such claims, meaning that Castro may avail himself 
of the misadvice holding under Teague only if there was First Circuit 
precedent prior to 2003 that would have dictated the same outcome 
as Padilla would in this case. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110-12. Second, 
the misadvice portion of Padilla’s holding may reflect established law, 
and thus not be part of the new rule—in which case Castro may rely on 
that holding (at least assuming there was no contrary First Circuit 
precedent as of 2003). Third, as explained below, neither of these 
alternatives may be clearly discernible from Padilla and Chaidez, 
requiring us to examine our own and other courts’ cases to determine the 
state of the law as of 2003. 
United States v. Castro–Taveras, 841 F.3d 34, 41 n.7 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); 
See also United States v. Chan, 792 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2015); Kovacs v. United States, 744 
F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014).  
31 Ex Parte Osvaldo, 534 S.W.3d 607, 621 (Tex. App. 2017) (“Had the Supreme Court 
viewed Lee’s misadvice claim as being barred by the non-retroactivity of Padilla’s rule, it 
could have denied the writ.”). 
4
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Lee’s writ, the Court held misadvising a client of deportation is 
objectively unreasonable under Strickland and, thus, retroactive under 
Padilla.  Second, rejecting a plea based on attorney misadvice could 
be considered a rational decision to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice 
prong.  The Court held it would not be irrational to reject a plea and 
pursue trial, but it limited its holding to Lee’s unusual circumstances.  
This Note argues that while Lee confirmed that Padilla is 
retroactive regarding misadvice claims, the Court construed its rule so 
narrowly that post-conviction relief for non-citizen defendants—
convicted before or after Padilla—will be limited to a very specific 
class of individuals who satisfy what this Note coins as the “unusual 
circumstance test.”  Therefore, a petitioner seeking relief under Lee 
must show the following: (1) counsel erroneously misadvised the 
petitioner regarding deportation; (2) deportation was the determinative 
issue in pleading guilty; (3) the record unambiguously supports this 
contention; (4) the petitioner has strong ties to the United States 
compared to the home country; and (5) the difference between 
pleading guilty and the maximum sentence at trial are not grossly 
disproportionate or an alternative disposition could be obtained at trial. 
This Note will be separated into eight parts.  Part II traces the 
procedural history of Lee’s journey to the Supreme Court.  Part III 
briefly explores the precedential history of ineffective counsel 
concluding with Padilla.  Part IV explains the circuit-court splits and 
the contrasting approaches to Padilla’s unanswered questions.  Part V 
returns to Lee in order to show why the case resolves Padilla’s 
unanswered questions concerning retroactivity and what is rational.  
Part VI will look at how cases apply Lee followed by Part VII which 
will synthesize Lee’s holding with subsequent courts applying Lee to 
show how a non-citizen petitioner can obtain relief under Lee.  Part 
VIII will conclude by predicting why Lee’s holding will result in an 
influx of unsuccessful ineffective counsel claims or Lee claims.  
II. JAE LEE’S JOURNEY TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 
In 1982, thirteen-year old Lee and his family left South Korea 
for a new life in the United States.32  For thirty-five years, Lee, a 
 
32 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1962. 
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permanent resident, never returned to his native South Korea.33  Like 
countless other new immigrants, Lee’s family settled in New York 
City.34  Lee seemed to be on the road towards living the American 
dream––after graduating business school, Lee moved to Memphis to 
work in a restaurant.35  A few years later, with the help of his parents, 
Lee opened his first Chinese restaurant and opened a second shortly 
thereafter.36  
Despite Lee’s success in the restaurant industry, he was, for 
reasons unknown, also a small-time drug dealer.37  A confidential 
government informant revealed to authorities that Lee, over eight 
years, “sold the informant approximately 200 ecstasy pills and two 
ounces of hydroponic marijuana.”38  Following a raid on Lee’s home, 
authorized by a search warrant, authorities discovered “88 ecstasy 
pills, three Valium tablets, $32,432 in cash, and a loaded rifle.”39  Lee 
took full responsibility for the drugs and weapon discovered.40 
A. Plea Bargain 
Lee was indicted by a federal grand jury “on one count of 
possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1).”41  Having no experience in the court system, Lee relied on 
his retained attorney who explained that Lee should plead guilty 
because trial was “very risky,”42 and a guilty plea likely would result 
in a “lighter sentence.”43  Specifically, as a first time offender, Lee was 
eligible for the safety valve exception44 to the otherwise ten year 
 
33 Id. at 1963. 
34 Id. at 1962. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1963. 





42 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963. 
43 Id. 
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012), which provided:  
Limitation on applicability of statutory minimums in certain cases.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an offense 
under section 401, 404, or 406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 841, 844, 846) or section 1010 or 1013 of the Controlled 
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960, 963), the court shall 
impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United 
6
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mandatory minimum for the charged offense.45  Although Lee trusted 
his attorney’s advice, he repeatedly asked his attorney if his non-
citizen status would result in deportation following the criminal 
proceedings to which the attorney replied, “[H]e would not be deported 
as a result of pleading guilty.”46  
During the plea hearing, the presiding judge warned Lee that a 
conviction could result in Lee’s deportation, followed by asking Lee if 
deportation affects his decision.47  Lee replied in the positive 
prompting the judge to question why deportation would affect his 
decision.48  Stunned, Lee asked his attorney what the judge was talking 
about and the attorney replied the judge’s question was a “standard 
 
States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without 
regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, 
after the Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a 
recommendation, that— 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as 
determined under the sentencing guidelines; 
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or 
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another 
participant to do so) in connection with the offense; 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any 
person; 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 
others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and 
was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 
408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has 
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the 
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the 
same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that 
the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that 
the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a 
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this 
requirement. 
45 United States v. Lee, No. 10-02698-JTF-dkv, 2013 WL 8116841, at *2, *12 (W.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 6, 2013), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, 2014 WL 
1260388 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017), vacated 869 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2017). 
46 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963.  “In fact, Lee explained, his attorney became ‘pretty upset because 
every time something comes up I always ask about immigration status,’ and the lawyer ‘always 
said why [are you] worrying about something that you don’t need to worry about.’”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
47 Id. at 1968 (“When the judge warned him that a conviction ‘could result in your being 
deported,’ and asked ‘[d]oes that at all affect your decision about whether you want to plead 
guilty or not,’ Lee answered ‘Yes, Your Honor.’” (alteration in original)). 
48 Id. 
7
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warning.”49  Convinced pleading guilty would not result in inevitable 
deportation, Lee entered a guilty plea, and the court sentenced him to 
imprisonment for one year and one day.50 
Shortly after receiving an otherwise very lenient sentence, for 
a crime carrying a ten year mandatory minimum,51 Lee learned he pled 
guilty to an aggravated felony under the Immigration Nationality Act, 
which, according to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),52 required 
mandatory deportation because of his non-citizen status.53  Lee, 
however, was eligible for the safety valve exception, which could have 
spared Lee the mandatory minimum because he was a first-time 
offender as well as reducing the sentence from a three to five year 
period of incarceration versus a likely mandatory minimum without 
the safety valve.54  Lee immediately sought post-conviction relief and 
filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,55 seeking his conviction 
and sentence be vacated because of defense counsel’s “constitutionally 
ineffective assistance.”56 
B. Procedural History 
The Magistrate recommended Lee’s conviction be set aside 
because it was based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel.57  The Magistrate explained that the Court in 
Chaidez confirmed that Padilla was not retroactive regarding failure 
to advise claims, which, thus, had no bearing on Lee because Lee was 
 
49 Id. 
50 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963. 
51 See 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
52 “Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon 
the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is . . . convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).  
53 Id. 
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), supra note 44. 
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), which provided: 
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of 
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court 
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
56 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963. 
57 Lee, 2013 WL 8116841, at *1. 
8
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relying on a separate, pre-existing rule (i.e., affirmative misadvice).58  
Moreover, considering the two-year difference between what Lee 
would have received under a plea and trial—because of safety valve 
eligibility—pursuing trial would have been rational.59  As such, the 
Magistrate found Lee met both prongs of the Strickland test because 
of the following: (1) affirmative misadvice to a client regarding 
deportation is objectively unreasonable;60 and (2) Lee was prejudiced 
by this misadvice—evidenced by Lee’s otherwise likely decision to try 
his luck at trial.61  
The District Court declined to adopt the Magistrate’s 
recommendation and denied Lee’s motion, stating Lee did not meet the 
prejudice prong of Strickland.62  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing 
with the District Court’s finding that Lee could not show prejudice 
under Strickland.63 The Sixth Circuit, however, provided more insight 
into its decision to deny Lee relief.64  The Sixth Circuit remarked, 
following Padilla, that other circuits were split regarding whether it 
would be “rational” to proceed to trial, despite overwhelming odds, 
with the hope of avoiding deportation.65  
On one side of the split was the Second, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits, which declined to find prejudice when the petitioner could 
not show any benefit from relief aside from a re-trial.66  These courts 
opined, pursuant to Hill, it would be objectively irrational to pursue 
trial when deportation was inevitable and there was no legal gain.67  
 
58 Id. at *8. 
The “new rule” identified by the Court in Chaidez as having been 
announced in Padilla is one that speaks to the attorney’s obligation to act 
(specifically, to advise). . . . Thus, to the extent Lee’s claim relies on a 
“separate rule” for affirmative misadvice in place at the time of his 
conviction, the fact that Padilla is not retroactive is inconsequential to 
Lee’s case. 
Id. 
59 Id. at *12. 
60 Id. at *11. 
61 Lee, 2013 WL 8116841, at *12.  
62 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1964 (“But, ‘[i]n light of the overwhelming evidence of Lee’s guilt,’ 
Lee ‘would have almost certainly’ been found guilty and received ‘a significantly longer 
prison sentence, and subsequent deportation,’ had he gone to trial.” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
63 Id.; see also Lee, 825 F.3d at 313.  
64 Id. at 313. 
65 Id. at 313-14.  
66 Id. at 313. 
67 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
9
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The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, found prejudice 
based solely on the misadvice itself.68  Of particular relevance, all of 
these courts agreed individuals in Lee’s position could show the 
erroneous advice satisfied the first prong of Strickland, but disagreed 
on how prejudice could be shown.69  Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit sided 
with the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits “in holding that a 
claimant’s ties to the United States should be taken into account in 
evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice 
caused prejudice.”70 
While the Sixth Circuit denied Lee’s motion, it explained its 
duty “is neither to prosecute nor to pardon; it is simply to say, ‘what 
the law is.’”71  The Sixth Circuit understood the existing law to mean 
a bare bones misadvice claim, without some legal gain, was 
insufficient to raise a successful ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.72  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether 
[Lee] can show he was prejudiced as a result”73 of the unanimously 
agreed objectively unreasonable representation that he received during 
the plea phase.74 
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision 
The Court focused its attention on the prejudice prong of 
Strickland.75  The Court discussed the history behind the prejudice 
 
68 Id. at 314. 
69 Compare Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012) (not rational), Haddad 
v. United States, 486 F. App’x 517, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2012) (same), Kovacs v. United States, 
744 F.3d 44, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2014) (same), United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 255–56 
(4th Cir. 2012) (same), and United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 724–29 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(same), with United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643–46 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated on other 
grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), DeBartolo v. United States, 790 
F.3d 775, 777–80 (7th Cir. 2015), United States v. Rodriguez–Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 789–90 
(9th Cir. 2015), and Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015). 
70 Lee, 825 F.3d at 316 (emphasis in original). 
71 Id. at 317 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).  
72 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1964 (“Relying on Circuit precedent holding that ‘no rational defendant 
charged with a deportable offense and facing overwhelming evidence of guilt would proceed 
to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter sentence,’ the Court of Appeals concluded 
that Lee could not show prejudice.” (citation omitted)).  
73 Id. at 1962. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1964 (“The first requirement is not at issue in today’s case: The Government 
concedes that Lee’s plea-stage counsel provided inadequate representation when he assured 
Lee that he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty.  The question is whether Lee can show 
he was prejudiced by that erroneous advice.” (citations omitted)). 
10
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prong for ineffective plea-stage counsel claims, concluding Hill 
requires that courts determine whether the petitioner would have gone 
to trial but for his attorney’s error.76  The majority focused on whether 
Lee would have gone to trial but for counsel’s misadvice.77  The 
majority took this approach because it interpreted Hill to mean that 
determinative issues behind pleading and going to trial, although 
usually resting on the shortest sentence, can also involve risk of 
deportation.78  
Deportation can be considered more severe than a few years in 
prison, which would justify rejecting an otherwise favorable plea 
agreement.79  In fact, as the Court noted, “preserving a client’s right to 
remain in the United States may be more important to the client than 
any potential jail sentence.”80  Therefore, by repeatedly asking his 
attorney if a guilty plea would result in his deportation, Lee proved that 
the determinative issue for him in pleading guilty was whether he 
would be deported.81  Lee’s prejudice, thus, was the inability to make 
an informed decision as to whether pleading guilty would affect his 
status in the United States––the only home he knew.82  By focusing on 
Lee’s determinative issue, the Court’s decision was not confined to 
whether the outcome would be different, but rather whether Lee had a 
chance to act on the determinative issue.83 
 
76 Id. at 1965 (“As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his counsel’s 
deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant 
can show prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” (quoting Hill, 
474 U.S. at 59). 
77 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965.  
78 Id. at 1966. 
79 Id. at 1968; see Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322-23 
(2001); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (stating “deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes” (footnote omitted)); Jennifer H. Berman, 
Padilla v. Kentucky: Overcoming Teague’s “Watershed” Exception to Non-Retroactivity, 15 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 700 (2014) (“If armed with the knowledge that a conviction is almost 
certain to land a defendant in immigration court, a defendant may very well choose to risk 
going to trial rather than accept a plea deal offering a reduced sentence.”).  
80 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322). 
81 Id.; see United States v. Pola, 703 F. App’x 414 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the petitioner’s 
pro se argument that deportation was a determinative issue because the record did not support 
the contention and the petitioner knew deportation was a possibility because ICE agents were 
in courtroom). 
82 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968.  
83 Id. at 1967. 
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However, the Court narrowed its rule to Lee’s “unusual 
circumstances.”84  In doing so, the Court essentially encouraged lower 
courts to consider the outcome when ruling on ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims presented by non-citizen defendants.85  Lee was able 
to satisfy this requirement because his eligibility for the safety valve 
reduced the ten-year mandatory minimum at trial to two to three years; 
gambling two to three years, instead of accepting a one-year plea, 
would be rational.86  
Another one of Lee’s unusual circumstances was the record 
supported his claim that deportation was the determinative issue in his 
decision to plead guilty.87  The Court cautioned against “post hoc 
assertions” by claimants that, but for their attorney’s misadvice, they 
would have pleaded guilty because deportation was the determinative 
issue.88  To further this end, the Court required the petitioners to point 
to the record in order to prove deportation was in fact the determinative 
issue when they entered the guilty plea.89  
The Court concluded, “Lee has demonstrated a ‘reasonable 
probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’”90 The 
consideration of the trial outcome, however, is not irrelevant in 
conducting the analysis because Lee had a mere two years to lose by 
going to trial.91  Thus, a decision to pursue trial to avoid deportation, 
despite inevitable deportation, would be rational for a petitioner in 
Lee’s position.92 
The dissenting Justices, however, rejected the majority’s 
holding because it “announce[d] a novel standard for prejudice at the 
plea stage.”93  The standard was deemed novel because Lee could not 
show, but for his counsel’s misadvice, the outcome would be 
 
84 Id. 
85 See infra Part V. 
86 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967 (“But where we are instead asking what an individual defendant 
would have done, the possibility of even a highly improbable result may be pertinent to the 
extent it would have affected his decisionmaking.”). 
87 Id. at 1969. 
88 Id.at 1967; See also Pola, 703 F. App’x at 421. 
89 See infra note 288 and accompanying text. 
90 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59) (alteration in original). 
91 Id. at 1967; see supra note 86. 
92 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969. 
93 Id. at 1969 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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different.94  The dissenting Justices concluded the Court erroneously 
found Lee showed prejudice because, even with competent advice, Lee 
likely would have lost at trial and been deported.95  Therefore, the 
novel standard, according to the dissent, provides that a petitioner can 
overturn a conviction if he, by pointing to the record, can show he 
subjectively would have rejected the plea and gone to trial, but for 
counsel’s misadvice regarding the consequences of the guilty plea.96  
According to the dissenting Justices, this novel standard is 
dangerous because it re-defined the prejudice prong of Strickland.97  
The dissent maintained the prejudice prong was re-defined because 
Strickland sought to narrow its holding to preclude reversal based on a 
“Hail Mary.”98  Strickland, thus, wanted to avoid petitioners coming 
forth with ineffective counsel claims based on a subjective belief and 
hope that an irrational jury would decide the case in his or her favor.99  
While the dissent focused the bulk of its criticism on the 
majority’s holding regarding the diminution of the prejudice prong, the 
Justices also predicted an influx of ineffective counsel claims resulting 
 
94 Id. at 1970 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“In other words, the defendant’s ability to 
show that he would have gone to trial is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish prejudice.”). 
95 Id. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“An 
error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if 
the error had no effect on the judgment.”), with Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370 (1993) 
(“Sheer outcome determination, however, was not sufficient to make out a claim under the 
Sixth Amendment.”), and Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 204 (2001) (“Although the 
amount by a which a defendant’s sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor 
to consider in determining whether counsel’s performance in failing to argue the point 
constitutes ineffective assistance, under a determinate system of constrained discretion[,] . . . 
it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice.”). 
96 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1970 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 1973 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.) (“In my view, we should take the Court’s 
precedents at their word and conclude that ‘[a]n error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting 
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691)).  
98 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 695 (“A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker . . . .”). 
99 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.)  
In the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the absence of a bona 
fide defense, a reasonable court or jury applying the law to the facts of this 
case would find the defendant guilty. There is no reasonable probability 
of any other verdict. A defendant in petitioner’s shoes, therefore, would 
have suffered the same deportation consequences regardless of whether 
he accepted a plea or went to trial. . . . Finding that petitioner has 
established prejudice in these circumstances turns Strickland on its head. 
Id. (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.)  
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from matters a defendant placed “paramount importance”100 on during 
plea negotiations.101  Particularly, the majority’s decision impacts the 
entire plea process because they lack the finality previously accorded 
to them.102  By concluding Lee’s attorney violated his Sixth 
Amendment rights, the holding is not limited to immigration cases, and 
so “a defendant who pleaded guilty need show only that he would have 
rejected his plea and gone to trial” to obtain relief.103  
III. INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL 101 
The Assistance of Counsel Clause in the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”104  
Assistance, however, does not merely mean having any counsel 
present, but rather effective assistance is required per the Sixth 
Amendment.105  Therefore, in order to raise an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, Strickland held the petitioner must show (1) his 
counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) “the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.”106  
Under Strickland, the reviewing court must find that the 
petitioner satisfies both prongs before obtaining any relief.107  The first 
prong evaluates whether counsel’s representation “fell below an 
 
100 Id. (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
101 Id. (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Under its rule, so long as a defendant alleges that 
his counsel omitted or misadvised him on a piece of information during the plea process that 
he considered of ‘paramount importance,’ he could allege a plausible claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.” (internal citation omitted)). 
102 Id. at 1975 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
103 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see, e.g., Young v. Spinner, 
873 F.3d 282, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that his attorney’s failure 
to inform him of a potential sentence for failing to register as a sex offender influenced his 
decisions to enter into a plea bargain and not go to trial); Thompson v. United States, 872 F.3d 
560, 562-63 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s ineffective counsel claim that he would have 
gone to trial but for counsel’s assertion that petitioner would have received twelve years in 
prison when he actually received life); United States v. Vaughn, 704 F. App’x 207 (3d Cir. 
2017) (reversing the district court’s holding that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to 
determine whether counsel’s advice was deficient and if so, whether petitioner, convicted of 
money laundering, was prejudiced). 
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
105 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).  
106 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
107 Id. (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”). 
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objective standard of reasonableness.”108  This prong reflects what the 
legal community expects of practicing attorneys.109  Thus, “[t]he 
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”110 
The second prong—prejudice—generally requires the lower 
courts to ask whether “the result of the particular proceeding is 
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our 
system counts on to produce just results.”111  However, prejudice is not 
assumed once counsel’s performance has been deemed deficient 
because the outcome could have otherwise been the same.112  Although 
Strickland dealt with a capital case where the ineffective counsel claim 
was raised due to defense counsel’s failure to compile mitigation 
letters for his capital sentencing hearing,113 the standard has also been 
applied to ineffective plea stage counsel.114  While the first prong of 
Strickland has generally remained constant, analyzing the prejudice 
prong varies for claims arising outside the death penalty setting.115 
One year after Strickland, in Hill v. Lockhart, the Court 
prescribed the approach for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 
the context of plea agreements.116  Under the second prong, courts 
consider whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”117  In these situations, the fundamental issue 
becomes whether the defendant was prejudiced by not having the 
 
108 Id. at 688.  
109 See id. at 687-88. 
110 Id. at 688; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (“The weight of prevailing professional 
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation.”). 
111 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
112 Id. at 693; see Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993) (stating “[t]hus, an analysis 
focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the 
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or 
sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may 
grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him”). 
113 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
114 Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 (“We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test 
applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also 
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169 (2012) (“The fact that [a defendant] is guilty does not 
mean he was not entitled by the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance or that he suffered 
no prejudice from his attorney’s deficient performance during plea bargaining.”). 
115 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000)). 
116 See supra note 114. 
117 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
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ability to exercise his right to a trial.118  However, the factors a 
defendant considers when deciding whether to go to trial vary such that 
one defendant may base his decision between entering a guilty plea or 
trial on length of sentence while another may base the same decision 
on deportation.119  When the latter is the determinative issue, the focus 
shifts from whether the outcome would be different to whether 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant by disabling 
him from exercising his right to pursue a jury trial.120  Therefore, the 
mere fact that a defendant did not have the opportunity to make an 
informed decision supersedes whether the decision would have still 
resulted in a finding of guilt.121 
Deportation presents a different context because the defendant 
may consider deportation a greater penalty than prison.122  The Court, 
in Padilla, added a new layer to Strickland when it held that counsel’s 
failure to advise his client of the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea satisfied the first prong.123  However, the question of whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise was 
remanded to the State.124  Nonetheless, the Court provided factors to 
consider.125  Notably, one of these factors was whether rejecting the 
 
118 Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (“The even more serious denial of the entire judicial 
proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a right, similarly 
demands a presumption of prejudice.”).  Conversely, a defendant who, due to erroneous advice 
of counsel, rejects a plea and loses at trial, is not precluded from obtaining a chance to plead 
because “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”  
Lafler, 556 U.S. at 170. 
119 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966-67. 
120 Id. at 1965.  
When a defendant alleges his counsel’s deficient performance led him to 
accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask whether, had he 
gone to trial, the result of that trial “would have been different” than the 
result of the plea bargain. That is because, while we ordinarily “apply a 
strong presumption of reliability to judicial proceedings,” “we cannot 
accord” any such presumption “to judicial proceedings that never took 
place.” 
Id. (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482-83). 
121 Id. at 1966 (“And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we 
prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn 
solely on the likelihood of conviction at trial.”). 
122 Id. (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322-23).  
123 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  
124 Id. (“Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he can 
satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to 
consider in the first instance.”). 
125 Id. at 372. 
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plea in favor of trial would be “rational under the circumstances.”126  
The aftermath of Padilla was wrought with confusion as to whether 
Padilla was retroactive and whether it could be rational to reject a plea 
agreement in lieu of trial.  
IV. THE SPLITS  
A. Padilla Is Retroactive  
Following Padilla, a number of state and federal courts were 
unsure as to whether Padilla was retroactive.127  Particularly, courts 
questioned whether Padilla announced a “new rule,” which according 
to Teague v. Lane,128 would preclude retroactivity.  Prior to the Court’s 
decision in Chaidez, however, two interpretations of whether Padilla 
was retroactive split the circuit courts.129  
1. Between Padilla and Chaidez 
According to the Third Circuit, Padilla was decided according 
to the guidelines set out in Strickland and Hill such that attorneys 
always had a duty to provide clients with accurate information at the 
plea stage.130  Moreover, Padilla noted, “For at least the past 15 years, 
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel 
to provide advice on the [removal] consequences of a client’s plea.”131  
 
126 Id. 
127 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347 n.2; compare Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 693 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (not retroactive), aff’d, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211 
(5th Cir. 2012) (same), United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) (same), 
and State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089 (N.J. 2012) (same), with Orocio, 645 F.3d at 630 
(retroactive), and Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011) (same). 
128 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).  A rule is a “new rule if the result was not dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
129 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347. 
130 Orocio, 645 F.3d at 639, abrogated by Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 342 (2013).  
Strickland and Hill required counsel to advise criminal defendants at the 
plea stage in accordance with precedent and prevailing professional norms 
to ensure that the defendant makes an informed, knowing, and voluntary 
decision whether to plead guilty. Padilla is set within the confines of 
Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney must give to a 
criminal defendant at the plea stage. 
Id. 
131 Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372). 
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Therefore, according to the Third Circuit, Padilla did not announce a 
new rule and the petitioner was entitled to a review of his claim under 
Padilla.132  
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit found Padilla did announce a 
new rule because it was the first time the Supreme Court held the Sixth 
Amendment required counsel to inform his client “about matters not 
directly related to their client’s criminal prosecution.” 133 
  The Seventh Circuit petitioner’s conviction became final 
conviction prior to Padilla.134  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
because the conviction became final before Padilla, she was barred 
from obtaining relief under Padilla—even though her attorney failed 
to inform her that the deportation would stem from a guilty plea.135  
The Supreme Court, one year after Padilla was decided, granted a writ 
of certiorari from the Seventh Circuit in Chaidez to determine whether 
Padilla announced a new rule.136  
2. Chaidez v. United States 
According to the Court in Chaidez, Padilla announced a new 
rule, which precluded retroactivity.137  Contrary to the Third Circuit, 
the Chaidez court noted that informing a client of the collateral 
consequences stemming from a guilty plea “is never a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.”138  In making this determination, Chaidez pointed 
to the fact that all ten federal appellate courts and thirty state appellate 
courts agreed the Sixth Amendment did not extend to informing a 
client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea.139  This lack of 
precedent, therefore, barred any retroactive application of Padilla 
because its Strickland analysis of a failure to advise claim in the 
context of a collateral consequence broke new ground, thus, creating a 
 
132 Id. 
133 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693 (“Before Padilla,the Court had never held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly 
related to their client’s criminal prosecution.”). 
134 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345. 
135 Id. at 346. 
136 Id. at 347. 
137 Id. at 357 (“This Court announced a new rule in Padilla.  Under Teague, defendants 
whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding.”). 
138 Id. at 350. 
139 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 350 (“All 10 federal appellate courts to consider the question 
decided, in the words of one, that “counsel’s failure to inform a defendant of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea is never” a violation of the Sixth Amendment.”). 
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new rule.140 Accordingly, a petitioner could not obtain relief under 
Padilla because, although her attorney may have failed to advise her 
that she would be deported, her conviction became final before 
Padilla.141  
Chaidez, however, acknowledged relief had previously been 
granted under Strickland when counsel misadvised clients about 
deportation.142  Despite this admission, both state and federal courts 
have denied relief to petitioners asserting misadvice claims on the 
grounds that Padilla’s rule applied to all advice claims involving 
collateral consequences.143  
In Chavarria v. United States,144 for example, the Seventh 
Circuit held the Sixth Amendment did not cover failure to advise or 
misadvise prior to Padilla.145  In Chavarria, the petitioner, a permanent 
resident from Mexico, repeatedly asked his attorney whether 
deportation would follow from a conviction.146  Each time the attorney 
 
140 Id. at 354. 
141 Id. at 347. 
142 Id. at 356. 
True enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state courts) held 
before Padilla that misstatements about deportation could support an 
ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that a 
lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise 
actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a 
criminal prosecution. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
143 Chavarria v. United States, 739 F.3d 360, 362-63 (7th Cir. 2014). 
A lawyer’s advice about matters not involving the “direct” 
consequences of a criminal conviction—collateral matters—is, in fact, 
irrelevant under the Sixth Amendment; such advice is categorically 
excluded from analysis as professionally incompetent, as measured by 
Strickland. . . . Thus, regardless of how egregious the failure of counsel 
was if it dealt with immigration consequences, pre-Padilla, both the Sixth 
Amendment and the Strickland test were irrelevant.  
The Chaidez majority jointly referred to both misadvice and non-
advice throughout its opinion. There is no question that the majority 
understood that Padilla announced a new rule for all advice, or lack 
thereof, with respect to the consequences of a criminal conviction for 
immigration status. 
Id.; see also United States v. Florian, No. 86 CR 850, 2016 WL 4611422, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
2016) (relying on Chaidez and Chavarria, the court explained that the petitioner could not 
obtain relief on a misadvice claim because petitioner’s conviction became final prior to 
Padilla); Barajas v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 3d 952, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (same); State 
v. Merheb, 858 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Neb. 2015) (same). 
144 739 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2014). 
145 Id. at 364. 
146 Id. at 361. 
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responded, “[T]he Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement . 
. . were not interested in deporting him.”147  The attorney also told 
petitioner to ignore the warnings from the judge regarding 
deportation.148  Nonetheless, the court in Chavarria held that 
petitioners, whose convictions became final prior to Padilla, were 
precluded from any retroactive relief for a misadvice claim.149  
3. Pre-Padilla 
In 1970, the D.C. Circuit Court raised the possibility of a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on erroneous 
advice concerning the likelihood of deportation.150  Fifteen years later, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s 
post-conviction motion and remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing regarding whether the petitioner’s counsel misadvised him 
regarding the prospect of deportation.151  According to the Eleventh 
Circuit, petitioner changed his plea from not guilty to guilty following 
the government’s decision to drop a count, and his attorney told him 
he was not deportable.152  Once he was released, he discovered he was 
subject to deportation and challenged his conviction.153 
The Eleventh Circuit made clear it would not “hold that an 
affirmative misrepresentation by an attorney in response to a specific 
inquiry by the accused which results in a plea of guilty necessarily 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.”154  However, the court 
then explained a Strickland analysis requires courts to consider all the 
circumstances.155  Accordingly, the case was remanded to establish 
whether petitioner’s allegations that his attorney misrepresented the 
prospect of deportation, which influenced his ability to enter a well-
 
147 Id. (citation omitted). 
148 Id. at 361. 
149 Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 361. 
150 United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Under appropriate 
circumstances the fact that a defendant has been misled as to [the] consequences of 
deportability may render his guilty plea subject to attack.”). 
151 Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985). 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1540. 
155 Id. at 1541. 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss3/7
2018 UNUSUAL CIRCUMTSANCES TEST 843 
informed guilty plea.156  Consistent with Lee, the Eleventh Circuit 
recognized—as early as 1985—attorney misadvice on a determinative 
issue warrants a second look and thus remanded to determine whether 
deportation was the determinative issue for the defendant in entering 
his guilty plea.157  
Subsequent cases, such as United States v. Couto,158 held that 
“affirmative misrepresentation[s] by counsel as to the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasonable.”159  
The Second Circuit relied on prior case law, which held counsel “has 
the obligation of advising [a non-citizen client] of his particular 
position as a consequence of his plea.”160  In Couto, the petitioner, a 
Brazilian citizen, was convicted of bribery and conspiracy to commit 
bribery of an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
official.161  Petitioner’s attorney told her if she did not accept the 
government’s plea agreement, she likely would face incarceration, but 
would not by pleading guilty.162  Of particular relevance, despite 
receiving notice of possible deportation from INS, petitioner’s attorney 
then erroneously informed her that deportation was avoidable through 
various means including a recommendation letter from the judge.163  
At the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court on 
post-conviction review, petitioner explained she would not have 
pleaded guilty had she known she would be subject to automatic 
deportation.164  This misrepresentation, combined with evidence of a 
 
156 Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1541 (“As a result, we conclude that under these unique 
circumstances Downs-Morgan is at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if he 
was afforded reasonably effective assistance from his counsel in deciding to plead guilty.”). 
157 See infra Part IV.B.2.  
158 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356. 
159 Id. at 188. 
160 Id. at 187 (quoting Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974)); see United 
States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Counsel has not merely failed to inform, 
but has effectively misled, his client about the immigration consequences of a conviction, 
counsel’s performance is objectively unreasonable under contemporary standards for attorney 
competence.”), opinion amended on reh’g, No. 03-50315, 2005 WL 1692492 (9th Cir. 
2005), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50 (“Even if 
the defendant were not initially aware of [possible waiver of deportation under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s prior] § 212(c), competent defense counsel, following the 
advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised him concerning the provision’s 
importance.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
161 Couto, 311 F.3d at 182.  
162 Id. at 183. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 184. 
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“reasonable probability,”165 that, but for counsel’s error, she would not 
have pled guilty and gone to trial, satisfied both prongs of Strickland, 
which invalidated the earlier guilty plea.166 
Courts prior to Padilla have clearly recognized that non-citizen 
defendants could successfully raise an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim when their attorneys affirmatively misrepresent the likelihood of 
deportation following a guilty plea, and the petitioner relied on this 
advice because deportation was a determinative issue.167  Thus, 
Padilla’s new rule is confined to failure to advise claims, and not 
misadvice claims, because courts prior to Padilla have recognized 
misadvice claims in the Sixth Amendment context.168  Proof lies in the 
fact that three circuit courts held, after Padilla and Chaidez, that 
Padilla’s holding is retroactive with regard to misadvice claims.169  In 
doing so, these courts decided, in reliance on their own precedent and 
the retroactivity application elicited by Teague, that claims based on 
erroneous advice concerning deportation at the plea stage are grounds 
for reversal under Strickland.170  
4. Post-Padilla & Chaidez 
The Second Circuit, in Kovacs v. United States,171 explained 
prior courts acknowledged that misadvice claims fell within the gambit 
of ineffective counsel contexts dating back to the 1970s.172  Although 
 
165 Id. at 188. 
166 Couto, 311 F.3d at 191. 
167 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 53 (holding a defendant can satisfy Strickland by showing that 
immigration consequences were the determinative issue in entering a guilty plea and his 
attorney erroneously told him pleading guilty to the charged offense would not impact his 
immigration status); see Chan, 792 F.3d at 1154 (same); United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841 
F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (same). 
168 Chan, 792 F.3d at 1152 (“Because we conclude that Kwan both survives Padilla v. 
Kentucky, and did not establish a new rule of criminal procedure under Teague v. Lane, we 
thus hold that Kwan applies retroactively to Chan’s case.” (citations omitted)). 
169 See supra infra Part IV.A.4. 
170 See infra Part IV.A.4. 
171 744 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014). 
172 Id. at 50. 
We have little trouble concluding that, by the time Kovacs’ 
conviction became final, the Couto rule was indicated, and was awaiting 
an instance in which it would be pronounced. Courts had concluded 
similar misadvice was objectively unreasonable as far back as the 1970s; 
our decisions reflected this trend long before Kovacs conviction. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
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the defendant’s conviction in Kovacs became final prior to the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Couto, he was still entitled to relief because 
“Couto did nothing more than apply the ‘age-old principle that a 
lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client.’”173  Therefore, the 
Second Circuit held that the petitioner satisfied his burden of showing 
prejudice because he could have litigated a statute of limitations 
defense or negotiated a plea favorable to his immigration status at 
trial.174  The petitioner, like Lee, was able to prove deportation was the 
determinative issue by pointing to the record of the plea hearing, which 
allowed the court to reverse the conviction in reliance on its own 
precedent.175  
In United States v. Castro-Taveras,176 the First Circuit 
elaborated on the holding in Kovacs regarding the “age-old principle 
that a lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client” by undergoing a 
lengthy analysis of retroactivity.177  The petitioner’s post-conviction 
petition alleged the 2003 conviction was invalid because it was 
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment due to his attorney’s 
misrepresentation of deportation consequences, which motivated his 
guilty plea.178  Prior to the retroactivity analysis, however, the court 
remarked that neither Padilla nor Chaidez expressly addressed 
whether misadvice claims are subject to a Strickland analysis.179  
Further, the court explained that it needed to dissect the question 
 
173 Id. at 51 (quoting Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 367) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
174 Id. at 53. 
175 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 48. 
Kovacs’ immigration concerns were aired during the plea hearing. At the 
outset, [counsel] sought to seal the minutes of the guilty plea so 
immigration officials could not see them. The district court warned 
Kovacs that immigration consequences were not in its control and that it 
would give no such assurance. [Counsel], however, responded that he 
“researched it and we feel comfortable that this is not a deportable 
offense.” At the conclusion of the proceeding, [counsel] again stated that 
“misprision of felony is not deportable.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
176 841 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016).  In Castro-Taveras, petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, 
plead guilty to what he discovered was an aggravated felony carrying mandatory deportation 
following his attorney’s conclusion that a probationary sentence would not result in 
deportation.  Id. at 36.  Six years after his three-year probationary sentence ended, petitioner 
applied for naturalization, but was denied because his probationary sentence did in fact carry 
with it mandatory deportation.  Id. at 37-38. 
177 See id. at 40-52. 
178 Id. at 38. 
179 Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 43. 
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regarding retroactivity in Teague, the seminal retroactivity case.180  
The court explained, if the circuit addressing the claim anticipated that 
the Supreme Court created a “new rule,” a petitioner could get relief 
even though the conviction was obtained prior to announcing this new 
rule.181  Conversely, if the circuit court did not have the new rule of 
law announced by the Court, but the state of the law reflected an 
understanding that the Supreme Court affirmed a new rule, the 
petitioner could nevertheless obtain relief.182  
 
180 Id. at 46. 
Having concluded that Padilla and Chaidez left undecided the 
question of whether Padilla’s new rule excludes (or includes) 
misrepresentation claims, we must undertake our own analysis as to 
whether Padilla’s holding on misadvice would have constituted a new rule 
based on the state of the law in the lower courts as of 2003. Indeed, the 
relevant question, in the language of Teague, is whether the lower courts 
in 2003 would have considered application of Strickland to a misadvice 
claim regarding deportation consequences “a garden-variety application 
of the test in Strickland,” Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107, such that it was 
“apparent to all reasonable jurists,” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528, 117 S. Ct. 
1517, that Strickland applied to Castro’s claim. 
Id. 
181 Id. at 41. 
Even when a Supreme Court holding constitutes a new rule, however, 
a defendant may still be able to take advantage of the legal principle it 
articulates in a collateral proceeding. That would be so if the applicable 
circuit law, at the time the defendant’s conviction became final, was 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s subsequently pronounced rule—i.e., 
if circuit precedent anticipated the path the Supreme Court would take, 
even though that law “would [not] have been ‘apparent to all reasonable 
jurists.’”  
Id. (quoting Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 47 (quoting Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 527–28)); see Kovacs, 
744 F.3d at 50–51 (identifying the circuit precedents that preceded Padilla); see also id. at 46 
(“If Padilla’s holding on misadvice constituted a new rule in 2003 based on the state of the 
law in the lower courts, then Castro’s Sixth Amendment claim would be barred under Teague, 
unless he can show that the First Circuit was an exception—i.e., we had a case prior to 2003 
that would have dictated the same outcome as Padilla would in this case.” (citation omitted)). 
182 See Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 48. 
That is to say, while no case of our own can support the proposition that 
“all reasonable jurists,” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528, 117 S. Ct. 1517, would 
have agreed that an affirmative misrepresentation on deportation 
consequences is subject to Strickland, pre–2003 law in other lower 
courts—combined with our own—could lead us to conclude that Padilla’s 
misadvice holding was, to borrow the words of our sister circuit, simply 
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The First Circuit previously permitted ineffective counsel 
claims based on collateral consequence claims derived from erroneous 
attorney advice.183  However, that alone was not enough according to 
the court.184  In other words, similar holdings in the circuit, which do 
not directly address the new rule, are not sufficient for a defendant to 
obtain retroactive relief.185  In these situations, where the circuit does 
not explicitly address the new rule, the state of the law must either 
permit misadvice claims for immigration consequences nationwide or 
the various holdings “appl[y] a general standard to the kind of factual 
circumstance it was meant to address.”186  
The court pointed to a number of district court and state court 
cases187 prior to Padilla, which held both misadvice claims relating to 
deportation consequences, and collateral consequences in general, are 
triable ineffective assistance of counsel issues pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment.188 Therefore, the Castro-Taveras court concluded, 
 
183 Id. at 47-48 (citing Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973); Cepulonis v. 
Ponte, 699 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1983); Wellman v. Maine, 962 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1992)).  
184 Id. at 48.  “[T]he fact that a court says that its decision is within the ‘logical compass’ of 
an earlier decision, or indeed that it is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive for 
purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”  Id. (quoting 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). 
185 Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 48. 
186 Id. at 50 (quoting Chaidez, 568 U.S at 347); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Where the beginning point is a rule of general application, 
a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be 
the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by 
precedent.”). 
187 See infra note 188. 
188 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 49-51; see Couto, 311 F.3d at 188; Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 
1540-41; United States v. Khalaf, 116 F.Supp. 2d 210, 214 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining that 
an attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation in response to a specific question about deportation 
consequences “may, under certain circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(same); Beavers v. Saffle, 216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ttorney advice which 
misrepresents the date of parole eligibility by several years can be objectively unreasonable.”); 
Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “a defendant may be 
entitled to habeas relief if counsel provides parole eligibility information that proves to be 
grossly erroneous”); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[G]ross 
misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”); 
Hill, 894 F.2d at 1010 (en banc) (“[T]he erroneous parole-eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill 
was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.”); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 n.6 
(5th Cir. 1987) (“Even if the Sixth Amendment does not impose on counsel an affirmative 
obligation to inform clients of the parole consequences of their pleas, . . . other courts have 
recognized a distinction between failure to inform and giving misinformation.”); Strader v. 
Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral 
consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he 
does not inquire, when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that 
25
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although the petitioner was convicted in 2003, he can still bring the 
claim because he was not barred by lack of retroactivity.189  
Clearly, Chavarria and other courts erred in holding that 
Chaidez barred misadvice claims where the convictions were final 
prior to Padilla.190  With that in mind, the following section will turn 
to the second split in order to determine why Padilla’s retroactivity is 
relevant.  While Lee confirms Padilla is retroactive regarding 
misadvise claims (thus, subjecting such claims to a Strickland 
analysis), the remaining question to be answered is whether, or to what 
extent, Lee’s second holding—it could be rational to gamble losing at 
trial to avoid deportation—is retroactive.  
B. It Is Rational To Reject a Favorable Plea In Order 
To Try and Avoid Deportation at Trial 
The obvious holding in Lee is that under Lee’s “unusual 
circumstances,” it would not be irrational to reject the favorable plea 
in lieu of going to trial to avoid deportation.191  Considering Padilla is 
retroactive regarding misadvice claims, the looming question is 
whether, and to what extent, Lee has any retroactive effect.  It could be 
readily assumed Lee restricted its holding to circumstances where the 
 
misinformation, he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.”).  See also state cases 
affirming misadvise claims concerning collateral consequences are subject to Strickland, 
which include the following: Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Cist. Ct. App. 2d 
2001); Goodall v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. 2000); State v. Vieira, 760 A.2d 
840, 843–44 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000); People v. Ping Cheung, 718 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. 
Ct. 2000); State v. Goforth, 503 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 
937, 942 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Hinson v. State, 377 S.E.2d 338, 339 (S.C. 1989); In re 
Peters, 750 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 
1983).  
189 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 52-53. 
190 Chan, 792 F.3d at 1157-58. 
[W]e acknowledge that our conclusion puts us at odds with the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling in Chavarria . . . . 
Ultimately, we read the language in Chaidez differently than the 
Seventh Circuit did in Chavarria, and we agree with the Second Circuit’s 
analysis in Kovacs. We thus conclude that Kwan did not announce a new 
rule of criminal procedure under Teague and that the rule in Kwan—
affirmative misrepresentations by defense counsel regarding immigration 
consequences is deficient under Strickland—can support Chan’s IAC 
claim. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) 
191 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967 (“In the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that Lee 
has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had 
he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation.”). 
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difference in sentence between pleading guilty and trial was a few 
years.192  For example, it is unlikely the Court would determine that 
rejecting a plea agreement for two years to pursue a trial, where the 
defendant faces fifty years, is in fact rational when deportation is 
inevitable.193  Alternatively, maybe Lee adopted a strict interpretation 
of Hill, which focuses on the defendant’s decision to take the plea 
rather than the outcome.194  
Although the two approaches seem to come into conflict, the 
Court explained, when “the error is one that is not alleged to be 
pertinent to a trial outcome, but is instead alleged to have affected a 
defendant’s understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea,” 
predicting the outcome of trial is not necessary.195  In fact, during oral 
arguments, Justice Kagan seemed unpersuaded by the Government’s 
argument that Lee’s inevitable deportation disabled him from showing 
prejudice by pointing to the Hill inquiry.196  The Lee Court likely chose 
to apply a strict application of Hill, but restricted it to situations where 
the decision to reject a plea in favor of trial would be rational so to 
 
192 Id. at 1966-67. 
The decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective 
consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. When those 
consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even 
the smallest chance of success at trial may look attractive. For example, a 
defendant with no realistic defense to a charge carrying a 20–year sentence 
may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea offer is 18 years. 
Id. 
193 Id. at 1966. 
A defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at 
trial. And a defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show 
prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution 
than would be likely after trial. But that is not because the prejudice 
inquiry in this context looks to the probability of a conviction for its own 
sake. It is instead because defendants obviously weigh their prospects at 
trial in deciding whether to accept a plea. 
Id. 
194 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966. 
The Government asks that we, like the Court of Appeals below, adopt 
a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice 
from the denial of his right to trial. . . . And, more fundamentally, the 
Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart 
focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on 
the likelihood of conviction after trial. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
195 Id. at 1967 n.3. 
196 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No. 
16-327). 
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avoid the types of claims the dissent anticipated.197  Therefore, to 
ascertain whether, and to what extent, non-citizen petitioners can 
obtain retroactive relief under Lee, courts must evaluate the rationality 
of decisions regarding a defendant’s rejection of a plea in lieu of trial. 
Wrestling with whether it is rational to throw a “Hail Mary” at 
trial in lieu of a favorable plea after Padilla, the circuit courts fall into 
two categories.  Courts in the first category hold that no defendant can 
show prejudice when deportation is inevitable and the chances of 
obtaining any form of relief at trial is impossible; courts in the second 
category hold the opposite.198  
1. It Could Be Rational If Relief Can Be 
Obtained At Trial 
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Akinsade,199 held the 
petitioner’s decision to reject the plea would be rational because he 
could have contested the restitution amount.200  In Akinsade, the 
petitioner was a lawful permanent resident from Nigeria who lived in 
the United States since he was seven years old.201  Twelve years after 
his arrival in the United States, he was charged with embezzlement.202  
During plea negotiations, petitioner twice asked his attorney if a 
conviction would result in deportation.203  Both times, the attorney 
replied in the negative because “he could only be deported if he had 
two felony convictions.”204  Relying on his attorney’s advice, the 
petitioner pleaded guilty—receiving a one-month sentence—only to 
find out the charged offense warranted mandatory deportation.205  
 
197 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.) (“Under its rule, so long as a 
defendant alleges that his counsel omitted or misadvised him on a piece of information during 
the plea process that he considered of “paramount importance,” ante, at 1968, he could allege 
a plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
198 See infra Part IV.B.1-2. 
199 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012). 
200 Id. at 256.  Ultimately, while the record supported the petitioner’s ineffective counsel 
claim, he succeeded on his prejudice claim because he showed that he could have contested 
the restitution at trial, but for the attorney’s erroneous advice.  Id. 
201 Id. at 250. 
202 Id.  
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During the plea hearing, the judge informed the petitioner he “could” 
be deported if he was not a citizen.206  
On these facts, the reviewing district court denied the 
petitioner’s claim.  The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because 
the district court’s admonishment was not concise enough because the 
petitioner was not told deportation was mandatory.207  Therefore, 
considering the court agreed that the petitioner could have contested 
the restitution amount at trial, the attorney’s erroneous advice 
prejudiced him because going to trial would have been rational.208 
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit, in Kovacs, 
explained prejudice is cognizable if the petitioner could show that he 
could have obtained an alternative disposition preventing deportation 
after trial.209  In Kovacs, because the petitioner could have obtained a 
plea avoiding deportation—which the government likely would have 
accepted—he demonstrated prejudice.210 Specifically, the court 
explained that the petitioner had a statute of limitations defense that 
could have culminated in alternative plea.211  Similarly, in United 
 
206 Id. at 254 (“Instead, the district court warned that Akinsade’s plea could lead to 
deportation.” (emphasis in original)). 
207 Id. at 254, 265 n.6.  In other cases in which the district court’s admonishment was found 
to have corrected counsel’s ineffective assistance regarding deportation, the courts inquired 
into whether the defendant understood the specific warning pertaining to deportation.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Hernandez–Monreal, 404 F. App’x 714, 715; Gonzalez v. United States, 
Nos. 10 Civ. 5463(AKH), 08 Cr. 146(AKH), 2010 WL 3465603, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 
2010) (explaining that the district court twice advised the defendant that he faced potential 
deportation and specifically asked the defendant, given that risk, whether he still wanted to 
plead guilty); United States v. Cruz–Veloz, Crim. No. 07–1023, 2010 WL 2925048, at *3 
(D.N.J. Jul. 20, 2010) (finding the petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to advise 
of deportation consequences because the district court admonished him that he would subject 
himself to deportation and further asked whether he understood the deportation consequence 
and still wanted to plead guilty).  Here, the district court did not elicit a direct response to the 
deportation admonishment, but instead asked if Akinsade understood a list of generalized 
warnings of which deportation was a part.  Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 254. 
208 Id. at 256. 
209 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 52. 
We conclude that a defense lawyer’s incorrect advice about the 
immigration consequences of a plea is prejudicial if it is shown that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there was a reasonable probability that 
the petitioner could have negotiated a plea that did not impact immigration 
status or that he would have litigated an available defense. 
Id. 
210 Id.; see, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 730 F. App’x 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2018) (Petitioner, 
convicted before Padilla, was granted coram nobis relief for her ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim because counsel’s performance precluded from raising a possible defense and 
the record unambiguously supported this contention.) 
211 Id. at 52-53. 
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States v. Chan,212 the district court held that the petitioner could not 
obtain relief because she could not show an alternative disposition at 
trial was possible.213  Prior to Lee, a bare showing of prejudice (i.e., 
without a contestable issue or chance of conviction for a non-
deportable offense) deriving from the misadvice would not have been 
enough in the Fourth or Second Circuits. 
2. It Could Be Rational Regardless Of Relief 
On the other end of the spectrum, in Hernandez v. United 
States,214 the Eleventh Circuit held the defendant, a Cuban citizen 
legally living in the United States, was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether the attorney’s erroneous advice 
regarding deportation, supported by the record, prejudiced him.215  
Although the Eleventh Circuit noted it need not hold an evidentiary 
hearing “if the allegations are ‘patently frivolous’ . . . or ‘affirmatively 
contradicted by the record,’”216 the court still held that an evidentiary 
hearing was required to determine if the petitioner was prejudiced 
 
To prevail on that ground, a petitioner must therefore demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that the prosecution would have accepted, and the 
court would have approved, a deal that had no adverse effect on the 
petitioner’s immigration status. . . .  
. . .  
Kovacs has sustained the very considerable burden of establishing 
prejudice under the principles reviewed above. It is apparent from the 
transcript of the Rule 11 hearing that Kovacs’ single-minded focus in the 
plea negotiations was the risk of immigration consequences. 
Id. 
212 No. CR 93-00583-RGK, 2015 WL 11438556, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015). 
213 Id. at *2. 
214 778 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2015). 
215 Id. at 1233-34. 
Hernandez alleged that his counsel advised him that there was a 
“substantial likel[i]hood that he would not be deported.” But “deportation 
[i]s presumptively mandatory” for convictions related to trafficking in a 
controlled substance.” see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at 
any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law 
. . . relating to a controlled substance . . . is deportable.”). The record 
corroborates Hernandez’s allegation because his counsel stated on the 
record that she “informed him that based on . . . [her] past experience . . . 
Cuban Defendants . . . generally . . . are not deported back to Cuba.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
216 Id. at 1232 (quoting Winthrop–Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 
2014) (quoting Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989)).  
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because the facts supported an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.217 
Contrary to Kovacs and Akinsade, the Eleventh Circuit opinion 
lacks any indicia that the petitioner in Hernandez was unable to offer 
a strategical reason for pursuing trial, but instead relied exclusively on 
his ties to the United States and the attorney’s misadvice regarding 
deportation.218  The Eleventh Circuit held the petitioner’s choice to risk 
more time in prison—he received 120 months—to remain in the 
United States could be rational.219  Synthesizing a rule for the pre-Lee 
cases is complicated because, while the circuit courts agreed erroneous 
advice regarding deportation satisfied the first Strickland prong, they 
disagreed on what needed to be shown to satisfy prejudice.220  
Specifically, they disagreed as to whether an alternative disposition 
could be reached at trial.221  
Lee clarifies this ambiguity because, unlike the defendant in 
Kovacs and Akinsade, Lee, like the petitioner in Hernandez had no real 
strategical reason to pursue trial except to avoid deportation.222  Lee 
had strong ties to the United States, ample evidence of his allegation 
in the record, and a few years to lose by pursuing trial.223  Thus, 
although Lee did not expressly address retroactivity, it seems the Court 
was cognizant of the split concerning what is rational and narrowed its 
rule to limit its application to cases where vacating the sentence would 
not appear to give the petitioner deference to, in the words of 
Strickland, the “luck of a lawless decisionmaker.”224  In the Second, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, therefore, the existing state of law would 
permit retroactive Lee-relief so long as the petitioner could obtain an 
alternative disposition while in the Eleventh Circuit, Lee will impose a 
higher bar.  
 
217 Id. at 1234. 
218 Id. at 1233-34. 
219 Id. at 1232. 
220 Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 250. 
221 Id.  
222 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969. 
223 See supra Part II.C. 
224 See supra Part II.C. 
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V. APPLYING LEE 
The number of cases citing Lee increases almost every day.  As 
of February 2018, a majority of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals 
cases citing Lee do not involve the immigration question.225  Rather, 
only two of the ten federal Circuit Court of Appeals cases involved a 
non-citizen petitioner seeking relief for attorney failures to properly 
advise them as to immigration consequences of entering a guilty 
plea.226 This section will consider how the federal courts interpret 
Lee.227  
A. Federal District Courts Applying Lee in 
Immigration Contexts 
The district courts, for the most part, have strictly applied Lee, 
but some petitioners have successfully overturned their convictions 
through Lee.228  The means by which the court granted relief, however, 
 
225 Cases not involving immigration are not discussed in this Note, but suffice to say 
petitioners have relied on Lee’s principle that erroneous advice by counsel prior to entering a 
plea is a ground for voiding the plea because pursuing a trial would be rational.  Compare 
Pola, 703 F. App’x at 414 (deportation), Dodd v. United States, 709 F. App’x 593 (11th Cir. 
2017) (same), with Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 283 (5th Cir. 2017) (mistaken belief 
regarding prospective sentence); Fox v. United States, No. 17-5352, 2017 WL 4404676, at *1 
(6th Cir. July 27, 2017) (same); Thompson v. United States, 872 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(same); Spriggs v. United States, No. 15-10659, 2017 WL 3411796, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 9, 
2017) (attorney failed to pursue motion to suppress); Vaughn, 2017 WL 3484974, at *1 
(attorney failed to communicate plea offer and object to guideline enhancement); United States 
v. Buchanan, 698 F. App’x 149, 150 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the district court erred in 
failing to allow withdrawal of plea); Schneider v. United States, 864 F.3d 518, 519 (7th Cir. 
2017) (“[T]rial lawyer was ineffective for advising him that he met the statutory elements of 
the offense of sexual abuse of a minor and for not explaining that his prior conduct could be 
considered during sentencing.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 437 (2017); and Stillwell v. United 
States, 709 F. App’x 585 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[C]ounsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
advising [petitioner] that the conduct related to two dismissed counts would not be considered 
relevant conduct for sentencing and that his appeal waiver would not prevent him from 
appealing the district court’s guidelines calculations.”). 
226 See infra Part V.B. 
227 State court decisions are omitted because a state denial of post-conviction relief can be 
appealed to federal district court, which will analyze the claim under established federal law.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2016) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect 
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States . . . .”). 
228 See, e.g., United States v. Tzen, No. 16-0734-DRH, 2017 WL 4233077, at *1 (S.D. Ill. 
Sept. 22, 2017); United States v. Hernandez, 282 F. Supp. 3d 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); United 
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have varied.229  For instance, in Hernandez, the petitioner only 
proffered a self-serving affidavit in support of her ineffective 
assistance claim.230  Even though the affidavit was the sole evidence, 
the district court inferred its validity from an immigration court’s 
finding that her attorney’s performance was ineffective.231  
Conversely, in United States v. Garcia,232 the district court held 
that the petitioner’s declaration alone was insufficient to support a 
claim that his attorney misadvised him regarding whether a guilty plea 
would result in automatic deportation.233  The court stated, because 
Garcia’s conviction became final prior to Padilla, “[H]e must show 
that counsel affirmatively misrepresented immigration consequences 
to him.”234  
1. Tzen v. United States 
In Tzen v. United States,235 the petitioner, a British citizen 
living in the United States, had her conviction overturned because her 
attorney failed to advise her of the deportation consequences of 
pleading guilty.236  Although petitioner also raised a claim that her 
attorney misadvised her, the Southern District of Illinois emphasized 
that its holding was based on the failure to advise claim.237  Despite 
this admonition, however, the court focused on petitioner’s ability to 
show, through her actions and the record, that deportation was the 
determinative issue in her decision to plead guilty.238  
 
States v. Arce-Flores, No. CR15-0386JLR, 2017 WL 4586326, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 16, 
2017).  
229 See infra Part V.A.1-2. 
230 Hernandez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 150. 
231 Id. at 151, 154. 
232 No. CR 99-0699-RSWL-3, 2017 WL 3669542, *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017). 
233 Id. at *4 (“Permitting such a declaration to carry the day for an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel analysis would allow virtually any defendant to retroactively claim that his attorney 
told him he would not be deported.”). 
234 Id. at *3 (citing Chan, 792 F.3d at 1154).  
235 No. 16-0734-DRH, 2017 WL 4233077, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017). 
236 Id. at *4. 
237 Id. at *1 (“[T]he Court focuses its discussion entirely to Tzen’s argument that counsel 
was ineffective in that he failed to inform her that if she pled guilty to the charges in the 
Indictment that she would be automatically deported.”). 
238 Id. at *4 (“It is clear to the Court that had Tzen received both clear and correct advice 
regarding her immigration status and clear and correct advice regarding the application of the 
aforementioned pattern instruction insofar as her the suspicion or indifference of her wrong-
doing, she would not have pleaded guilty.”) 
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The petitioner hired an immigration attorney who told her she 
could avoid deportation by showing she was not a national security 
threat.239  Moreover, her trial lawyer e-mailed the Assistant United 
States Attorney (“AUSA”) saying, “Tzen is desperate not to be 
deported.”240  The court also emphasized her plea agreement only 
states she “may” be deported and during the plea hearing she was told 
there “was a real possibility of being deported.”241  Lastly, her attorney 
failed to challenge a jury instruction, which foreclosed a valid 
defense.242  The combination of the “confusing, conflicting, and 
wrong” advice given by her attorneys and the courts’ failure to clarify 
the confusion was enough for petitioner to successfully argue that her 
Sixth Amendment rights were violated.243  
2. United States v. Arce-Flores 
In United States v. Arce-Flores,244 the petitioner challenged her 
2016 time-served conviction arguing her attorney misadvised her as to 
the implications of a guilty plea on her chances of avoiding removal.245  
She rejected an otherwise favorable plea to ensure that she had a 
chance at contesting her removal for being in the country illegally.246  
According to the record, her attorney explained, “as long as Ms. Arce-
Flores pleaded guilty to a crime for which the maximum sentence was 
less than 365 days, she would be eligible to contest her removal.”247  
On that presumption, the petitioner instructed her attorney to make a 
counter-offer where she would plead guilty to a lesser offense, which 
carried a maximum sentence of six months.248  The Government agreed 
and petitioner received a sentence of time served.249  She was then 
 
239 Id. at *3 (“[Immigration attorney] stated: If not, the next best thing would be to have the 
Judge and the prosecutor put on the record, and judgment and sentence, that they do not feel 
Gemma is a threat to national security, border security, or public safety and they do not 
recommend that she be deported back to England.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
240 Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077, at *3. 
241 Id.  
242 Id. at *4. 
243 Id. at *3. 
244 No. CR15-0386JLR, 2017 WL 4586326, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 16, 2017).  
245 Id. at *3. 
246 Id. at *2. 
247 Id. at *1. 
248 Id. 
249 Arce-Flores, 2017 WL 4586326, at *2.  
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remanded to ICE custody for removal proceedings because “she had 
served at least 180 days for a criminal offense.” 250 
In light of her attorney’s error, the petitioner asked the district 
court to re-sentence her to 179 days to potentially avoid removal by 
showing she was of good moral character.251  The petitioner also 
pursued a writ of coram nobis (withdrawal of a guilty plea).252  The 
district court denied the petitioner’s request stating “the most lenient 
sentence it could impose . . . was six (6) months.” 253  However, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the issue to the district court to 
consider the coram nobis writ. 254  
Prior to the remand, the district court explained, relying on Lee, 
that in the immigration context, Strickland’s first prong is satisfied 
when counsel fails to advise, or misadvises, the petitioner of 
immigration consequences stemming from a guilty plea.255  According 
to the court, the petitioner satisfied her burden.256 Regarding 
Strickland’s prejudice prong, however, the petitioner must show 
rejecting the plea would be rational under the circumstances.257  
Specifically, for non-citizens illegally in the United States, the court 
explained the petitioner can satisfy its burden by (1) citing cases 
indicating the government allowed a similarly charged defendant to 
plead to a non-removable offense, (2) showing the plea was motivated 
 
250 Id. at *2. 
251 Id. at *3. 
252 Id. at *4. 
253 Id. at *3. 
254 United States v. Arce-Flores, No. CR15-0386JLR, 2018 WL 401524, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 12, 2018) (“The court ordered the supplemental briefing after the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals remanded Ms. Arce-Flores’s appeal ‘for the limited purpose of enabling the [ ] court 
to consider [her] motion for a writ of error coram nobis.’” (alteration in original) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
255 Id. at *8. 
256 Arce-Flores, 2017 WL 4586326, at *9. 
During plea negotiations, Mr. Engelhard affirmatively advised Ms. Arce-
Flores that as long as she pleaded guilty to an offense with a maximum 
sentence below 365 days, she would still be able to contest her removal 
from the United States. . . . Thus, Mr. Engelhard misadvised Ms. Arce- 
Flores about the immigration consequences, despite clear law on this 
issue. This misadvice also undermined the plea agreement and plea 
colloquy’s general warnings about the possibility of deportation, given 
that Ms. Arce-Flores believed the crime to which she was pleading guilty 
would nevertheless allow her to contest removal. 
Id. 
257 Id. at *10. 
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by a desire to avoid deportation, and (3) “in the absence of a more 
favorable plea agreement, he or she would have gone to trial.”258   
Following the remand, the court explained, unlike other cases 
involving a non-citizen petitioner illegally in the United States, the 
instant petitioner was trying to cancel her removal by satisfying the 
“good moral character” requirement prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1).259  In light of the remand, the court affirmed its initial 
finding that the petitioner satisfied Strickland.260  Although the court 
did not reiterate the factors it concluded were necessary for a non-
citizen illegally in the United States to satisfy Strickland, the 
application reflected the prescribed analysis, and the petitioner’s 
sentence was not only vacated but also reduced from 180 to 179 
days.261 
With the exception of Garcia, district courts seem to construe 
an attorney’s inconclusive opinion regarding deportation and 
affirmative misrepresentation as one and the same.262  Relying on 
Padilla, these courts explained, “But when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct 
advice is equally clear.”263  In other words, failing to give accurate 
advice has been interpreted as a complete failure to give any advice.264   
Once the first prong is met, the district courts turn to Lee to 
determine whether the petitioner was prejudiced by the erroneous or 
 
258 Id. (“A petitioner can demonstrate this prejudice by (1) identifying cases that indicate 
the government’s willingness to permit defendants charged with the same or substantially 
similar crime to plead guilty to a nonremovable offense, (2) showing that he or she 
purposefully agreed to the charge to avoid adverse immigration consequences, or (3) in the 
absence of a more favorable plea agreement, he or she would have gone to trial.” (citing Vega, 
797 F.3d at 789)). 
259 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2016) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal of, 
and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is 
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien . . . has been a person of good 
moral character during such period.”). 
260 Arce-Flores, 2018 WL 401524, at *3 (“Counsel’s failure to mention the importance of 
a one-day sentence reduction depriv[ed Ms. Arce-Flores] of an opportunity to have a 
sentencing court exercise its discretion in her favor, which would have allowed Ms. Arce-
Flores to apply for the good moral character waiver. In short, counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced Ms. Arce-Flores.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)). 
261 Id. at *3, *5 (“Where ‘a nominally shorter sentence’ would enable a petitioner to avoid 
deportation, there is a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed the shorter 
sentence.” (quoting Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1017)). 
262 Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077 at *4. 
263 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. 
264 See United States v. Hernandez, 283 F. Supp. 3d 144, 147, 150 (S.D.NY. 2018).  
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inconclusive advice.265  Although the means by which petitioners raise 
this claim vary between writs of coram nobis and § 2255 motions, the 
district courts have been consistent in granting relief under Strickland 
so long as the claim is supported by a sufficient finding that the 
determinative issue in pleading guilty is avoiding deportation.266  As 
such, no acute test has been prescribed by the district courts.267  
B. Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Applying Lee in 
Immigration Contexts 
Unlike the district courts, petitioners have not obtained relief 
in the federal circuit courts of appeals.268  However, the circuit courts 
have seemingly prescribed a test to determine whether a petitioner can 
obtain relief under Lee.269  While they have established concise rules; 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have carved out exceptions to prevent 
relief.270 
1. United States v. Pola  
In United States v. Pola,271 the petitioner, a Canadian citizen 
legally living in the United States with his American wife and two 
American children, had a lengthy post-conviction history.272  The 
petitioner was convicted in 2010, one month before Padilla, for 
“knowingly and intentionally possessing oxycodone with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).”273  One 
year after the conviction, petitioner filed a § 2255 motion alleging 
ineffective counsel on grounds unrelated to the immigration 
consequences resulting from an error made by his attorney.274  Six 
 
265 See supra note 231. 
266 Garcia, 2017 WL 3669542 at *4 (“[A]llegedly, Defendant inquired whether he would 
be deported and [his attorney] told Defendant he would not be deported. By contrast, [his 
attorney] states in his declaration that generally, he would note all significant discussions with 
his client, but there is no apparent notation of this conversation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
267 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
268 See Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077 at *1; Hernandez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 144; Arce-Flores, 
2017 WL 4586326, at *1. 
269 See infra Part VI. 
270 See infra Part VI. 
271 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 414. 
272 Id. at 415. 
273 Id. at 416. 
274 Id. 
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years later, however, petitioner moved to have his conviction reversed 
arguing that his attorney both failed to advise and misadvised him of 
deportation consequences.275 
In interpreting Lee, the Sixth Circuit concluded relief was 
granted to him, Lee, because (1) counsel erroneously misadvised Lee 
regarding deportation, (2) deportation was the determinative issue in 
pleading guilty, and (3) the record supported the allegation with 
testimony by both Lee and his attorney.276  Even if the petitioner in 
Pola, could show that his attorney misadvised him, the Sixth Circuit 
maintained he could not show prejudice because the AUSA 
“indirectly” confirmed petitioner’s deportability during the plea, 
petitioner did not object, and petitioner’s passport had been 
surrendered to ICE prior to entering the guilty plea.277  ICE agents, 
moreover, were in the court at sentencing.278  Therefore, the Sixth 
Circuit explained, petitioner had enough notice from the AUSA and 
presence of ICE agents to overcome any prejudice from his attorney’s 
erroneous advice.279  
Petitioner’s counsel raised no concerns of deportation during 
either the plea or sentencing hearings.280  The Sixth Circuit ultimately 
held that the petitioner could not carry his burden because “the record 
[was] devoid of evidence supporting [petitioner’s] claim that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel based on inadequate advisement 
of immigration consequences.”281  The Sixth Circuit, therefore, was 
 
275 Id. at 418, 420. (“He has not shown how more accurate advice by [his attorney] about 
the likelihood of his release from the courtroom after sentencing (which did not in fact have 
any impact on his immigration status) would have altered his decision to waive his rights to 
trial and enter an Alford plea.” (emphasis added)). 
276 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 421 (“The Lee Court went on to grant relief for three reasons: it 
was undisputed that Lee’s counsel had erroneously advised him that he would not be deported; 
deportation was clearly the determinative issue in Lee’s decision to plead guilty; and both Lee 
and his attorney testified that Lee would have gone to trial if he had known about the 
deportation consequences.”). 
277 Id. at 418-19. 
278 Id. at 420-21. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 419 (“The issue was also apparent, albeit not well developed, at Pola’s sentencing 
hearing.  Yet, again, Pola did not object to the prospect of deportation at sentencing either.” 
(emphasis added)). 
281 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 421 (“In sum, the record is devoid of evidence supporting Pola’s 
claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on inadequate advisement of 
immigration consequences.”). 
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unwilling to, as it explained, grant relief based on post hoc 
assertions.282 
2. Dodd v. United States 
In Dodd v. United States,283 petitioner, a British citizen legally 
living in the United States, sought relief arguing her counsel failed to 
inform, and misinformed her, as to possible deportation.284  The crux 
of petitioner’s argument is that she would have rejected the, now 
deemed, unfavorable plea and gone to trial if she knew, with certainty, 
the immigration consequences of doing so.285  
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, turned to Lee 
noting Lee obtained relief because “deportation was the determinative 
issue, Lee had strong connections to the United States and no other 
country, and the consequences for proceeding to trial were not 
markedly harsher than pleading.”286  According to the Eleventh 
Circuit, the petitioner in Dodd could not meet the criteria in Lee.287  
Specifically, the record proved the determinative issue for pleading 
guilty was the following: fear of “facing her daughter at trial,” 
evidence presented at her son’s trial, counsel informing her she could 
be deported, lack of objections or questions posed during the plea or 
sentencing hearing regarding deportation, and the petitioner 
“repeatedly [lying] during the proceedings.”288  Moreover, as the 
Eleventh Circuit explained, petitioner inquired about transferring and 
serving her sentence in England, which “weigh[ed] against a finding 
that she was willing to risk a larger sentence to secure the possibility 
of remaining in the United States.”289 
Based on Pola and Dodd, it seems the two circuit courts to 
interpret Lee in the deportation context understand the Lee majority 
 
282 Id. at 424 (“Again, these are precisely they kinds of unsupported ‘post hoc assertions’ 
and mere “expressed preferences” we are adjured to ignore in favor of “contemporaneous 
evidence.” Lee, at 1967. In the end, Pola has failed to make his case based on evidence.”). 
283 Dodd, 709 Fed. Appx. at 593. 
284 Id. at 594. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 595. 
287 Id.  In other words, Lee’s claim was not some post hoc assertion, but rather was “backed 
by substantial and uncontroverted evidence” that he would have rejected the plea in favor of 
trial if he knew deportation was inevitable.  Dodd, 709 Fed. Appx. at 595. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 596. 
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intended that Lee be strictly applied.290  What is interesting, however, 
is how these two courts apply factors such as continuously lying on the 
record and other factors that show petitioner was aware of the issue of 
deportation to justify denying the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.291  Put simply, circuit courts, like the Supreme Court, likely 
will grant relief only if the circumstances are truly as unusual as Lee’s 
and will ensure the record fully supports the purported 
circumstances.292 
VI. THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE TEST  
The Court in Lee predicated its holding, according to the 
dissent, on a limited interpretation of Hill.293  Its narrow rule, however, 
tightens the application because Hill’s holding permitted relief by 
demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”294  Lee’s unusual circumstances requirement is a variation of Hill 
because it likely denies relief if the petitioner wants to void an 
otherwise favorable plea to pursue an almost certain, far lengthier, 
conviction at trial.295  Lee’s holding, moreover, sets the bar for what is 
rational under Padilla.296  Lee does so in holding that although there 
 
290 See supra note 274. 
291 See Pola, 703 Fed. Appx. at 418-20 (explaining that the AUSA indirectly informed a 
petitioner of deportation to show that the petitioner knew about deportation because of (1) the 
presence of ICE agents in a courtroom to show petitioner knew about deportation, (2) the 
seizure of a petitioner’s passport to show petitioner knew about deportation, and (3) the lack 
of objections during plea or sentencing hearings to show that the petitioner was not concerned 
with deportation).  See also Dodd, 709 Fed. Appx. at 595-96 (discussing that inquiries into 
prison transfers to show deportation was not the determinative issue in pleading guilty). 
292 Id.  
293 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1972 (“In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost exclusively 
on the single line from Hill that the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
294 Id. at 1964 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). 
295 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (“For example, a defendant with no realistic defense to a 
charge carrying a 20-year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea 
offer is 18 years. . . . But where we are instead asking what an individual defendant would 
have done, the possibility of even a highly improbable result may be pertinent to the extent it 
would have affected his decisionmaking.”). 
296 Id. at 1968-69. 
We cannot agree that it would be irrational for a defendant in Lee’s 
position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial. But for his attorney’s 
incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea agreement 
40
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could be a reasonable probability the petitioner would have not pled 
guilty and gone to trial, the decision to do so must also be satisfactorily 
rational.297  As far as the circuit courts are concerned, in relation to 
those petitioning the courts, Lee’s decision would be rational only 
under Lee’s unusual circumstances.298  Therefore, contrary to the 
dissent’s conclusion that Lee simplified Strickland’s prejudice inquiry, 
the majority’s holding actually made it harder to obtain relief because 
the petitioner must satisfy the unusual circumstances requirement.299 
In Pola, the Sixth Circuit set out the Lee test, but in doing so, 
it omitted the unusual circumstances requirement.300  Therefore, the 
proper test for relief under Lee, regardless of whether the conviction 
became final prior to Padilla, requires the petitioner show (1) counsel 
erroneously misadvised petitioner regarding deportation, (2) 
deportation was the determinative issue in pleading guilty, (3) the 
record unambiguously supports the contention that deportation was the 
determinative factor,  (4) the petitioner has strong ties to the United 
States compared to the home country, and (5) the petitioner’s unusual 
circumstances result in the difference between pleading guilty and the 
maximum sentence at trial not being grossly disproportionate or an 
alternative disposition could be obtained at trial.  However, Pola and 
Dodd illustrate how courts can carve out exceptions, which supply an 
inference that the claim is merely the post hoc assertion Lee sought to 
avoid.301  Reviewing examples of courts carving out exceptions to each 
element will illustrate this.  
First, a number of courts before and after Lee held a curative 
strike could overcome prejudice resulting from an attorney’s 
misadvice so long as the strike is affirmative rather than 
 
would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly. If 
deportation were the “determinative issue” for an individual in plea 
discussions, as it was for Lee; if that individual had strong connections to 
this country and no other, as did Lee; and if the consequences of taking a 
chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading, as in this case, 
that “almost” could make all the difference. Balanced against holding on 
to some chance of avoiding deportation was a year or two more of prison 
time. Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to reject the 
plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  See also Pola, 703 Fed. Appx. at 423. 
297 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). 
298 Id.  
299 Id.  
300 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 424. 
301 Id.  
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hypothetical.302  In fact, Lee itself mentions this in a footnote.303  
Moreover, in Pola, the court explained the presence of ICE agents in 
the courtroom and seizure of petitioner’s passport put him on notice 
that he was subject to deportation.304  
Second and third, in Dodd, the petitioner’s prior statements that 
she pleaded guilty fearing her daughter would testify against her at trial 
disproved the contention that deportation was the determinative 
issue.305  Fourth, again in Dodd, the petitioner alleged she had strong 
ties to the United States, but the court inferred from petitioner’s raising 
the issue of a possible prisoner transfer to her country of origin that her 
ties there were stronger.306  Thus, a reviewing court could consider 
other factors in determining whether the petitioner satisfies the unusual 
circumstance test, which further complicates matters for petitioners.307  
 
302 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1975 n. 4.   
Several courts have noted that a judge’s warnings at a plea colloquy may 
undermine a claim that the defendant was prejudiced by his attorney’s 
misadvice.  See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 805 F.3d 1143, 1147 
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Kayode, 777 F.3d at 728–729; Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 
253; Boyd v. Yukins, 99 F. App’x 699, 705 (6th Cir. 2004). The present 
case involves a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel extending to advice 
specifically undermining the judge’s warnings themselves, which the 
defendant contemporaneously stated on the record he did not understand. 
There has been no suggestion here that the sentencing judge’s statements 
at the plea colloquy cured any prejudice from the erroneous advice of 
Lee’s counsel. 
Id. 
303 Id.; Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077, at *3. 
304 Pola, 703 Fed. App’x at 420-21. 
305 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
306 See supra note 296. 
The primary objective of the international prisoner transfer program is to 
facilitate the rehabilitation of the prisoner so that he may be a productive 
member of society in his home country upon release from incarceration. 
The prisoner transfer program is premised on the universal understanding 
that a prisoner has the best chance of being successfully rehabilitated and 
reintegrated into a society where a support system exists to assist the 
prisoner’s adjustment to life after incarceration. 
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Transfer Requests Submitted by Foreign Nationals, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-oeo/guidelines-evaluation-transfer-requests-
submitted-foreign-nationals (last updated Aug. 17, 2016) (emphasis added). 
307 See supra note 298. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, Lee v. United States seemed to hold that a 
petitioner’s decision to reject a favorable plea to pursue his 
constitutional right to trial is rational even when deportation remains 
inevitable.308  This assumption, however, is false.  In denying Lee 
relief, the Sixth Circuit remarked, although it sympathized with Lee’s 
plight, its job “is neither to prosecute nor to pardon; it is simply to say 
‘what the law is.’”309  Lee clarified what the law is albeit limiting its 
rule to Lee’s unusual circumstances.  In conclusion, although the Court 
in Lee confirmed that misadvice claims are retroactive under Padilla, 
a limited class of petitioners will be able to prove all five elements 
required to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. 
 
 
308 Zachary Segal & Cory Morris, Jae Lee v. United States: Immigration Consequences 
Trump Prejudice Prong of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Analysis Under Strickland, 
SUFFOLK LAW (Sept. 2017), at 18, 23, https://www.scba.org/eva/displayFile.php? 
id=3227. 
309 See supra note 71. 
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